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ARE NOT INVALID PER SE
Ferry v. Ferry'
Rita and Nelson Ferry were married in 1973. Each had been married
previously, and each prior marriage had produced a child before ending in
divorce. A few weeks before they were married, Nelson suggested an
antenuptial agreement be drafted by his attorney to settle property ques-
tions which might arise incident to death of one spouse or upon divorce.
Rita received a copy of the draft, and she signed it in the midst of the hectic
rush two days prior to the marriage. Rita had wanted some of the terms
changed, but, although agreed to, the proposed changes were never
made. She signed the agreement under a mistaken belief, shared by
Nelson, that the agreement was necessary to ensure that her son's prospec-
tive inheritance from her parents' estates would not be shared with Nelson
or his family. She neither sought nor received independent legal advice
before signing.
The agreement provided that if Nelson predeceased Rita, she would
receive the household furnishings, an automobile, and $1,000. In ex-
change, she waived all claims to a homestead exemption, family allow-
ance, and other surviving spousal rights. If there were a divorce, Rita
would receive the household furnishings and a car. As consideration, she
waived all claims for support, alimony, attorney's fees, and costs. The con-
tract contained no specific provision dividing marital property. 2 A
schedule of Nelson's assets, including farm equipment, livestock, and
cash, was attached to the agreement. None of these assets were valued on
the schedule, although they were apparently of significant value. Some
bonds and a life insurance policy were omitted completely from the
schedule. None of Rita's assets were disclosed in the agreement, appar-
ently because of their nominal worth.
After four years of marriage, Rita commenced an uncontested dissolu-
tion action shortly after her separation from Nelson. There was undis-
puted evidence at the dissolution hearing that Rita had participated in the
1. 586 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
2. See RSMO § 452.330.2 (1978) (defining "marital property").
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day-to-day working of the farmland leased to Nelson. The trial court dis-
solved the marriage and enforced the antenuptial agreement, setting aside
the household furnishings and automobile to Rita and all other property to
Nelson. The court also denied Rita's request for maintenance and attor-
ney's fees.
In a case of first impression in Missouri, the Missouri Court of Appeals
for the Western District rejected the general rule that antenuptial con-
tracts contingent upon divorce are void as against public policy, and
declared these contracts enforceable if conscionable and entered into
fairly. The court applied both the standard of conscionability under the
separation agreement section of the dissolution statute and the standard of
review applicable to antenuptial contracts contingent upon death. It
found the contract to be both unconscionable and violative of the stan-
dards for antenuptial agreements in contemplation of death. The court
also held that Missouri's dissolution statute requires a trial court to identify
and divide marital property, irrespective of the validity of the antenuptial
agreement.
Historically, all antenuptial contracts purporting to determine sup-
port or property rights upon divorce were void as against public policy.3
The modern trend, however, has been "for courts to analyze the terms of
these... [agreements] on a case [by] case basis and uphold their validity if
they are fair and reasonable. 4 The primary argument supporting the rule
3. See Hughes v. Hughes, 251 Ark. 63, 66, 471 S.W.2d 355, 357 (1971);
Oliphant v. Oliphant, 177 Ark. 613, 625-26, 7 S.W.2d 783, 788 (1928) (possibly
overruled in Dingledine v. Dingledine, 258 Ark. 204, 523 S.W.2d 189 (1975);
Hughes v. Hughes, 251 Ark. 63, 471 S.W.2d 355 (1971)); Posner v. Posner, 206
So. 2d 416, 417 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), rev'd, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970);
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 217 Ga. 234, 255, 123 S.E.2d 115, 133 (1961); In re Mar-
riage of Gudenkauf, 204 N.W.2d 586, 587 (Iowa 1973); Ranney v. Ranney, 219
Kan. 428, 431, 548 P.2d 734, 737-38 (1976); French v. McAnarney, 290 Mass.
544, 548, 195 N.E. 714, 716 (1935); Dearbaugh v. Dearbaugh, 110Ohio App.
540, 542, 170 N.E.2d 262, 264 (1959); Connolly v. Connolly, 270 N.W.2d 44,
47-48 (S.D. 1978); Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 604, 385 S.W.2d 288,
293 (1964); Kunde v. Kunde, 52 Wis. 2d 559, 560, 191 N.W.2d 41, 42 (1971);
Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 127-28, 42 N.W.2d 500, 502 (1950). See generally
Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 942 (1958); Annot., 98 A.L.R. 533 (1935); Annot., 70
A.L.R. 826 (1931).
4. Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill. App. 3d 83, 87, 320 N.E.2d 506, 509 (1974). See
also Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 136, 531 P.2d 176, 181 (1975); In re
Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 352, 551 P.2d 323, 329-30, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3,
9-10 (1976); Parniawski v. Parniawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, -, 359 A.2d 719,
721-22 (1976); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 386 (Fla. 1970); Volid v. Volid,
6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 391-92, 286 N.E.2d 42, 47 (1972); Flora v. Flora, 166 Ind.
App. 620, 629-30, 337 N.E.2d 846, 851 (1975); Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39,
45, 505 P.2d 600, 604 (1973); Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596, 597 (Okla.
1960); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 107, 506 P.2d 719, 721 (1973); Fried-
1981]
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voiding all antenuptial agreements in contemplation of divorce is that the
state has a fundamental interest in preserving marriage5 which is thwarted
by any antenuptial bargain that induces a separation or divorce. 6 In re-
buttal, the modem cases argue that the increased incidence of divorce and
the adoption of no-fault divorce statutes require a recognition that the
state's interest in preserving marriage should no longer require that per-
sons remain married forever. 7 Rather, with divorce such a commonplace
fact of life, prospective marriage partners should be allowed to regulate
property and alimony rights in the event their marriage fails. 8 In addition,
it is suggested, there has been no empirical showing of a causal relationship
between these agreements and divorce. 9 To the contrary, some assert that
lander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 302, 494 P.2d 208, 214 (1972); Laird v.
Laird, 597 P.2d 463, 467 (Wyo. 1979).
5. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1970); French v.
McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544, 546, 195 N.E. 714, 715 (1935); Fricke v. Fricke, 257
Wis. 124, 126, 42 N.W.2d 500, 501 (1950); Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract,
26 U. MIAMI L. REV. 692, 705 (1972); Note, Interspousal Contracts: The Poten-
tial for Validation in Massachusetts, 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 185, 199 (1974).
6. Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d at 785 (citing Evans, Antenuptial Contracts
Determining Property Rights upon Death or Divorce, 47 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 31,
45 (1978) (quoting 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL
CONTRACTS § 90-20 (1964))). For example, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App.
594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), it was suggested that
[s]uch contracts could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife
any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability
would be limited. In other words, a husband could through abuse and ill
treatment of his wife force her to bring an action for divorce and thereby
buy a divorce for a sum far less than he would otherwise have to pay.
Id. at 604, 385 S.W.2d at 293. Conversely, the ability of a mercenary husband to
enforce an antenuptial agreement might induce an innocent wife to endure con-
duct that would otherwise be a ground for divorce rather than bring an action for
dissolution and receive insufficient funds for support. See Norris v. Norris, 174
N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1970).
7. Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 391, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46 (1972). Stated
differently, one court has noted:
The adoption of the "no fault" concept of divorce is indicative of the
state's policy ... that marriage between spouses who "can't get along" is
not worth preserving. We believe a marriage preserved only because
good behavior by the husband is enforced by the threat of having to pay
alimony is also not worth preserving ....
Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 105, 506 P.2d 719, 721 (1973).
8. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970). See also Spector v.
Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 136, 531 P.2d 176, 181 (1975); Parniawski v. Par-
niawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, -, 359 A.2d 719, 721 (1976); Volid v. Volid, 6
Ill. App. 3d 386, 392, 286 N.E.2d 42, 47 (1972); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or.
102, 105, 506 P.2d 719, 721 (1973).
9. Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 391, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46 (1972);
230 [Vol. 46
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antenuptial contracts, by defining the expectations of the parties, actually
promote stability in marriage.' 0 In fact, antenuptial agreements settling
property rights incident to the death of a spouse are favored by the law as
conducive to marital tranquility."I
The second argument for invalidating antenuptial contracts contem-
plating divorce is that they commercialize the marriage relation.' 2 In re-
sponse it should be noted that the Spanish community property system has
always enforced antenuptial contracts. 1 3 The fact that there is no evidence
of denigration of the marriage institution in community property states in-
dicates there is no denigration of marriage as a result of the ability to make
antenuptial contracts.
A third argument against enforcing antenuptial contracts contingent
upon divorce is that they interfere with the duty of the husband to support
Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 106, 506 P.2d 719, 721 (1973); Fricke v.
Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 130, 42 N.W.2d 500, 503 (1950) (Brown, J., dissenting).
10. Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 130, 42 N.W.2d 500, 503 (1950) (Brown,
J., dissenting). One writer has commented:
Perhaps the most effective argument in support of interspousal con-
tracts is that these contracts would further the state's goal of supporting
the continuance and stability of marriage. The essence of an interspousal
contract is the effort by the spouses to articulate and negotiate their ex-
pectations of individual behavior within a framework of shared marital
goals.... At the same time that it attempts to prevent divorce, an inter-
spousal contract may recognize that such a possibility exists for every
marriage.
Note, supra note 5, at 204.
11. See, e.g., Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1970). Some courts
advocate treating antenuptial contracts contingent upon divorce in the same
manner as they treat antenuptial contracts contingent upon death. See Flora v.
Flora, 166 Ind. App. 620, 629, 337 N.E.2d 846, 851 (1975); Hudson v. Hudson,
350 P.2d 596, 597 (Okla. 1960).
12. See Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 126, 42 N.W.2d 500, 501 (1950);
Evans, Antenuptial Contracts Determining Property Rights upon Death or
Divorce, 47 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 31, 45 (1978); Gamble, supra note 5, at 705. A
parallel concern is that if the state allows spouses to regulate their relationship by
contract, courts will become bogged down in regulating trivial incidents of the
marital relation. Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 150, 161
(1979); Gamble, supra, at 705; Note, supra note 5, at 199, 213 n.151. Cf. Weitz-
man, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV.
1169 (1974) (arguing that the traditional assumptions on which the definition of
marriage are based are anachronistic and that the marriage partners should be
able to fashion the legal structure of the relationship).
13. The rationale of the community property system for allowing enforce-
ment of antenuptial agreements is that the state should regulate the conjugal
partnership only if the spouses fail to do so. W. DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY § 59, at 116 (2d ed. 1971).
1981]
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his wife. 14 If the husband were allowed to avoid this obligation by contract,
many dependent spouses would have to rely on charity for their liveli-
hood.' 5 Furthermore, many women might be cheated out of compensation
in the form of support and property rights for their nonmarket labor dur-
ing marriage, such as childrearing and maintenance of the home.' 6 A
rebuttal to this position is that any antenuptial agreement which does not
provide adequate support to an economically dependent spouse probably
would be unenforceable under the standards of "conscionability"' 7 or
"reasonable support"' 8 utilized by courts upholding these agreements.
A further objection to antenuptial contracts contemplating divorce is
that they are inherently unfair.19 This argument has at least three aspects.
First, there is usually a long time lag between execution of the antenuptial
contract and dissolution. Thus, what may be fair at the time of execution
probably will not be reasonable at dissolution because of intervening
changes in circumstances. 20 Second, any enforceable antenuptial contract
deprives the trial judge of his discretionary power to create equity between
the parties.21 Third, it is suggested that the usual dependent economic
status of women means they have less business acumen and less bargaining
strength than their male counterparts. 22 The response of some courts to
14. One court has observed:
[T]he state has a paramount interest in the adequate support of its citi-
zens, and, therefore, the husband's duty of support, either before or
after divorce, should not be left to private control. This argument has
more and more cogency as government increasingly considers itself
responsible for the adequate support of its citizens.
Reiling v. Reiling, 256 Or. 448, 450, 474 P.2d 327, 328 (1970) (overruled in
Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973)). But see Krauskopf &
Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and Inequitable
Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558 (1974) (arguing that the wife's support
rights are illusory at best).
15. See Evans, supra note 12, at 47; Gamble, supra note 5, at 705.
16. See Klarman, Marital Agreements in Contemplation of Divorce, 10 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 397, 405 (1977).
17. See notes 31-35 and accompanying text infra.
18. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
19. See Evans, supra note 12, at 49; Klarman, supra note 16, at 405.
20. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 1.9, at 28-29 (1968).
21. Posrier v. Posner, 206 So. 2d 416, 417 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), rev'd,
233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970). For example, RSMO § 452.330.1 (1978) provides that
"the court ... shall divide the marital property in such proportions as the court
deems just after considering all relevant factors." Thus, any contract provision
varying the result that would have been reached by the trial judge is inherently
"unjust."
22. Reilingv. Reiling, 256 Or. 448,451,474 P.2d 327,328 (1970) (overruled
in Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973)). But see Note, supra




Gebhardt: Gebhardt: Antenuptial Contracts Contingent upon Divorce Are Not Invalid Per Se
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
RECENT CASES
the inherent unfairness argument is to enforce these contracts only if they
are conscionable.2 3 If the contract is conscionable it is by definition fair.
The Ferry court in deciding whether antenuptial agreements contin-
gent upon divorce are void as against public policy held that "it is no longer
valid merely to assign 'public policy' as a basis to reject such agreements if
fairly reached between the parties and if adequately providing support for
the [economically dependent] spouse consistent with need and available
resources. '24 The court based this conclusion on two premises. First, the
court stated that no "significant current authority"25 supports the proposi-
tion that all antenuptial contracts contingent upon divorce are unenforce-
able on grounds of public policy. Second, the court believed Missouri's
enactment of the dissolution statute manifested an overriding public
policy favoring amicable settlement of maintenance and property ques-
tions whether the settlement be by antenuptial or by separation agree-
ment.
26
The Ferry court looked to the dissolution statute for the standards to
be used in determining the enforceability of antenuptial agreements con-
tingent upon divorce. This creates a problem in that the separation agree-
ment section of the dissolution statute does not apply to antenuptial
agreements on its face. The statute allows parties to make a conscionable
written agreement "attendant upon their separation or the dissolution of
their marriage. 27 In In re Marriage ofBequette28 a separation agreement
23. See, e.g., Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
24. Id. at 786. -
25. Id. There are a few recent cases which voided antenuptial contracts con-
tingent upon divorce on grounds of public policy. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Gudenkauf, 204 N.W.2d 586, 587 (Iowa 1973); Ranney v. Ranney, 219 Kan.
428, 431, 548 P.2d 734, 737-38 (1976); Connolly v. Connolly, 270 N.W.2d 44,
47-48 (S.D. 1978). These courts used public policy in a way similar to the fashion
the Ferry court used the doctrine of conscionability, i.e., to strike down any con-
tract that it does not like.
26. As authority the court quoted the comments to the UNIFORM MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE ACT § 306 (1970 version): "This section entirely reverses the older
view that property settlement agreements are against public policy because they
tend to promote divorce." The Ferry court took this language out of context,
however. This section of the statute deals only with separation agreements, while
the issue in Ferry was the validity of antenuptial agreements providing for prop-
erty division and maintenance in the event of divorce. Separation agreements are
made at arms length, attendant to separation; the current economic circum-
stances of each party can be ascertained and reflected in the agreement. Ante-
nuptial agreements, on the other hand, are made when the parties have mutual
confidence and trust, years before marital break-up. Thus, when an antenuptial
property settlement contingent upon divorce is produced at trial, it is highly un-
likely to further amicability between the parties.
27. RSMO § 452.325 (1978) provides in part:
1. To promote the amicable settlement of disputes between the parties
1981] 233
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was held not made "attendant upon.., separation" because it was made
six months before separation. 29 In Ferry the antenuptial contract was
entered into about four years prior to the separation. In fact, it is hard to
imagine an antenuptial agreement made attendant upon separation since
these agreements are made attendant to marriage.3 0 Thus, the separation
section of the dissolution statute does not apply to contracts such as the one
in Ferry, but the court nevertheless applied the statute.
A second problem with the Ferry court's application of the separation
agreement section of the statute is the court's use of the conscionability
doctrine. The court required the contract in Ferry to meet the conscion-
ability standard implicit in the separation agreement section of the disso-
lution statute. The court held that the standard of conscionability in the
dissolution statute is the "same standard employed in commercial law, 3 1
citing as authority the Official Comments to the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act. The Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code state the
test for commercial conscionability as "whether, in the light of the general
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade
or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable
under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
contract. "32
to a marriage attendant upon their separation or the dissolution of
their marriage, the parties may enter into a written separation
agreement containing provisions for the maintenance of either of
them, the disposition of any property owned by either of them, and
the custody, support and visitation of their children.
2. In a proceeding for the dissolution of marriage or for legal separa-
tion, the terms of the separation agreement, except terms providing
for the custody, support, and visitation of children, are binding
upon the court unless it finds, after considering the economic cir-
cumstances of the parties and any other relevant evidence produced
by the parties .... that the separation agreement is unconscionable.
28. 563 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978).
29. Id. at 530-31. The Bequette court seemed to reason that the purpose of
RSMo § 452.325 (1978) is to allow spouses to bargain for a property settlement,
but only at arms length. If the agreement is not made in connection with an im-
minent separation, the spouses are still in a relation of confidence, and economic
circumstances at the time of dissolution are as yet unknown. 563 S.W.2d at 531.
30. It is possible to contemplate marriage and divorce in the same instru-
ment. See In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 349-50, 551 P.2d 323,
327-28, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3, 7-8 (1976) (sole purpose of marriage was to legitimize
a child, after which, the agreement provided that most of the incidents of mar-
riage would not continue).
31. 586 S.W.2d at 786. But the standard for this test may be questioned
after two recent cases dealing with separation agreements. Rojas v. Rojas, 595
S.W.2d 729 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980); Block v. Block, 593 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. App.,
W.D. 1980).
32. U.C.C. § 2-302, Official Comment (1962 version) (emphasis added).
234 [Vol. 46
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It is difficult to see how a test of conscionability that utilizes concepts
such as "commercial needs" and "commercial background" is to be
adapted to antenuptial agreements contingent upon divorce. In fact, the
court by its own terms may not have applied this standard of conscion-
ability. The Ferry court expressly reserved the question of whether an
antenuptial agreement contingent upon divorce would be tested for con-
scionability at the time it is executed or at dissolution when it is to be en-
forced.3 3 The commercial law standard for conscionability, however,
clearly judges the contract for conscionability at the time of its making.3 4 If
the Ferry court had applied the commercial law standard of conscionabil-
ity, it would not have had to reserve the issue of when the contract is to be
judged for conscionability, for that question would already have been
answered. Further evidence that the Ferry court did not intend to
transplant unaltered the commercial conscionability test from commercial
settings to the domestic relations area is the fact that the same court which
decided Ferry stated in Wilkerson v. Wilkerson3 5 that the Uniform Com-
mercial Code has no relevance to a dissolution proceeding in Missouri. Yet
33. 586 S.W.2d at 787. At least four approaches have been advocated in
determining when to judge the conscionability of an antenuptial contract contin-
gent upon divorce. One is not to enforce the contract unless it provides an ade-
quate amount of support at the time the contract is enforced. Connolly v. Con-
nolly, 270 N.W.2d 44, 47 (S.D. 1978), noted in Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d at 787
n.3. A second approach is to measure validity at the execution of the contract and
to provide that the contract can be modified as if it were a maintenance award.
Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 386 (Fla. 1970) (Spector, J., concurring).
Another approach is to require that the contract provide an adequate amount of
support at its inception and at the time it is enforced. Clark, supra note 12, at
151. See Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1972). A fourth response is to
measure the adequacy of the provision only at the time of execution. Posner v.
Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 385-86 (Fla. 1970).
As a practical matter the time at which the amount of support is measured for
reasonableness may not be as critical as it seems. Evidence used to determine the
adequacy of the provision is presented at the dissolution proceeding, and the
court's decision is thus arguably tainted by the changes that have occurred in the
intervening years. See Cathey, Ante-Nuptial Agreements in Arkansas-A
Drafter's Problem, 24 ARK. L. REV. 275, 291 (1970).
The Ferry court may have implicitly answered the question of when the con-
tract must be conscionable by applying the commercial law conscionability stan-
dard in RSMO § 452.325 (1978). 586 S.W.2d at 786. Under the U.C.C. standard,
conscionability is to be determined at the time the contract was entered. See note
32 and accompanying text supra. On the other hand, Professor Clark argues that
use of the vague conscionability doctrine is a compromise position by which a
court can skirt the issue of when the contract is to be tested for reasonableness.
Clark, supra, at 151 n.50.
34. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
35. 555 S.W.2d 689, 690-91 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977). Accord, In re Mar-
riage of Baker, 584 S.W.2d 449, 450 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979).
19811 235
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the Uniform Commercial Code section 2-302 embodies the standard of
commercial conscionability the Ferry court applied to antenuptial agree-
ments contingent upon divorce. The focus of conscionability in the
dissolution context should not be exclusively on one-sidedness and oppres-
sion in bargaining position, as is the focus of the commercial conscionabil-
ity standard, but should include a determination of whether the contract
provides adequate support for an economically dependent spouse.
In addition to the conscionability test, the Ferry court held that the
standards of judicial review for antenuptial agreements that predated the
enactment of the dissolution statute "have ... survived and are implicit in
the statutory directives which now govern the trial courts in property divi-
sion and maintenance awards in dissolution cases." '36 Since the only ante-
nuptial agreements that were valid before the Ferry case were antenuptial
agreements contingent upon death, the court has applied implicitly the
standards of review for antenuptial agreements contingent upon death to
antenuptial agreements contingent upon divorce. Generally, the Missouri
Probate Code requires full disclosure of the nature and extent of the par-
ties' assets and that the economically dependent spouse receive "fair con-
sideration under all the circumstances" in order for there to be a valid
antenuptial agreement contingent upon death.3 7 It is not clear whether
"fair consideration under all the circumstances" is the same standard as
the conscionability doctrine applied by the Ferry court. What is clear from
Ferry is that an antenuptial contract contingent upon divorce must be con-
scionable and the economically independent spouse must make full dis-
closure of his or her financial assets before the contract is enforceable in
Missouri.38
The final holding in Ferry was that the trial court has the obligation to
identify and divide marital property, irrespective of the validity of the
36. 586 S.W.2d at 786.
37. See RSMO §§ 474.120, .220 (1978).
38. 586 S.W.2d at 786. There is a split of authority as to whether full dis-
closure or a reasonable provision for the economically dependent spouse is re-
quired for a valid antenuptial contract contingent upon death. Del Vecchio v.
Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1962), is the leading case holding that if full
disclosure is made, then no provision for the economically dependent spouse is re-
quired. See also Potter v. Collin, 321 So. 2d 128, 131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
In Lindsay v. Lindsay, 163 So. 2d 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), the court ap-
plied the Del Vecchio rule requiring either a reasonable provision for the
economically dependent spouse or full disclosure in order to uphold antenuptial
contracts contingent upon divorce. There are two Missouri cases, Estate of
Youngblood v. Youngblood, 457 S.W.2d 750, 756 (Mo. En Banc 1970), and Mar-
shall v. Estate of Marshall, 529 S.W.2d 914, 918 (Mo. App., K.C. 1975), which
go some way in adopting the Del Vecchio rule. If the Del Vecchio rule is adopted
by Missouri in the future as to antenuptial contracts contingent upon death, one
could make the argument that the same rule should be applied to antenuptial
contracts contingent upon divorce.
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antenuptial agreement. The contract in Ferry made no reference to mari-
tal property. This was unfortunate in that it leaves unanswered the ques-
tion whether such a contract may validly designate property in the
antenuptial agreement as the "separate property" 39 of the parties. The
definition of marital property in the dissolution statute provides that prop-
erty may be excluded from "marital property" by "valid agreement. '40
Since Ferry held that antenuptial agreements contingent upon divorce are
valid agreements, one can argue that it is possible to exclude property from
the jurisdiction of the trial court at a dissolution proceeding by antenuptial
agreement. On the other hand, one could argue that the language "valid
agreement" in the dissolution statute refers only to separation agreements
on the theory that separation agreements are the only agreements that
were provided for or contemplated by the legislature when it enacted the
dissolution statute.
Ferry leaves the draftsman of an antenuptial agreement with an ex-
ceedingly delicate task. 41 Because of the vagueness of the conscionability
doctrine and the uncertainty whether an antenuptial contract contingent
upon divorce will be tested for conscionability at the time of execution or
at the time of dissolution, no one can predict with any reasonable certainty
whether a provision in an antenuptial agreement will be enforceable. To
preserve as much of the contract as possible one can include in the contract
a severability clause to the effect that the invalidity of any provision shall
not affect the validity of any other provision.42 Putting case names in the
39. Although there is no statutory definition of "separate property," what is
meant by this term is property owned by the marriage partner that is not marital
property, and thus, not within the trial court's jurisdiction to divide property at
the dissolution proceeding under RSMO § 452.330 (1978).
40. RSMo § 452.330.2 (1978). This section provides that "'marital prop-
erty' means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage ex-
cept: . . . (4) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties .... "
41. Forms for antenuptial agreements may be found in 2 A. LINDEY,
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 90 (1980); Peter-
son & Eckhardt, Legal Forms, 6 MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES § 582 (1960); 9 AM.
JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2d §§ 139:11-:44 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
42. See Cathey, supra note 33, at 288. See also Cathey, Ante-NuptialAgree-
ments in Arkansas-Divorce Provisions, 29 ARK. L. REV. 480 (1976). Courts dis-
agree as to whether they should strike down the whole contract or just the offend-
ing clause. Gamble, supra note 5, at 708. In Reiling v. Reiling, 256 Or. 448, 474
P.2d 327 (1970) (overruled in Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719
(1973)), a support provision in an antenuptial contract contingent upon divorce
was struck down as against public policy. In Stratton v. Wilson, 170 Ky. 61, 185
S.W. 522 (1916), invalid provisions contingent upon divorce were severed from
provisions contingent upon the death of a spouse and the death provisions en-
forced. It should be noted, however, that RSMO § 452.325 (1978), upon which
the Ferry court relied, makes no reference to severability and requires unquali-
fiedly that the parties renegotiate a new contract after a finding of unconscion-
ability, at least in the case of separation agreements.
1981] 237
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contract would alert the trial judge at the dissolution proceeding that the
draftsman was "attempting to follow a permissible pattern .... Nothing
can be lost by the practice and, hopefully, it will encourage the courts to
give full recognition to the case precedents upon which the legal draftsman
has relied. '43
Also, the differing levels of enforceability of these contracts among the
states can cause conflict of laws problems. For example, if the parties ex-
ecute an antenuptial agreement contingent upon divorce in Missouri,
which now recognizes the validity of these agreements under Ferry, and
later change their residence and institute dissolution proceedings in a state
that still voids these contracts on grounds of public policy, such as Kansas
or Iowa," the issue of invalidity on grounds of public policy is reopened.
To avoid this type problem, a conflict of laws provision could be used. 4"
The danger that the antenuptial contract will be invalidated because
there was insufficient disclosure can also be reduced by the draftsman.
Proof of full and frank disclosure46 can best be effected by a recital by the
dependent spouse in the antenuptial agreement that such disclosure was
made. The recital should be coupled, however, with a schedule of the
economically independent spouse's assets. Using only a recital may be in-
sufficient. This is because the parol evidence rule will not keep out extrin-
sic evidence that there was insufficient disclosure. 47 The proponent prob-
43. See Cathey, Ante-Nuptial Agreements in Arkansas-Divorce Provi-
sions, 29 ARK. L. REV. 480, 484 (1976).
44. See note 25 supra.
45. The provision recommended for use in Arkansas is:
The validity of this contract, matters affecting its interpretation, and its
effect shall be governed by the law of Arkansas even though the domicile
of the marriage, that of either or both of the parties to this agreement, or
the nature, extent or location of any property owned by either may
change after the execution of this agreement. This agreement shall
govern as to the rights of either party in the real estate of the other upon
the death of the first to die except as the law of the state in which real
estate is located may prohibit the application of this contract to the
rights of a surviving spouse in real property located outside the State of
Arkansas.
Cathey, supra note 33, at 276.
46. For the requirements of disclosure for antenuptial contracts contingent
upon death in Missouri, see Mathis v. Crane, 360 Mo. 631, 641, 230 S.W.2d 707,
712 (1950); Wilson v. Wilson, 354 S.W.2d 532, 544-46 (Mo. App., Spr. 1962);
Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 873 (1953). But cf. Estate of Youngblood v. Youngblood,
457 S.W.2d 750, 757-58 (Mo. En Banc 1970) (marriage of convenience; wife's
business judgment was therefore not clouded).
47. See, e.g., In re Strickland's Estate, 181 Neb. 478, 484-85, 149 N.W.2d
344, 351 (1967) (parol evidence rule does not apply to recitals of fact in a con-
tract); In re Gelb's Estate, 425 Pa. 117, 120, 228 A.2d 367, 369 (1967) (full dis-
closure is a substantive element of a valid antenuptial contract contingent upon
238 [Vol. 46
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ably has the burden of showing full and frank disclosure, 48 which can best
be satisfied by use of a schedule. In addition, Ferry indicates the schedule
should contain the values of the various assets. This was not done in Ferry
and probably was a factor weighing against the husband. 49 Moreover, list-
ing assets in a schedule may help minimize the risk that assets will not be
disclosed because the owner has forgotten about them, such as the life in-
surance policy and bonds in Ferry. 0
Another problem for the draftsman is determining what amount is
reasonable support for the economically dependent spouse. In re Estate of
Hillegass51 listed the following factors in determining reasonableness:
Reasonableness will depend upon the totality of all the facts and
circumstances at the time of the Agreement, including (a) the
financial worth of the intended husband; (b) the financial status of
the intended wife; (c) the age of the parties; (d) the number of
children each has; (e) the intelligence of the parties; (f) whether
the . . . [dependent spouse] aided in the accumulation of the
wealth of the ... [economically independent spouse]; and (g) the
standard of living which the . . . [dependent spouse] had before
marriage and could reasonably expect to have during marriage. 52
Given the confidential relationship between the prospective marriage
partners53 and the conflicts of interest inherent in advising both parties,
54
death that must be proved by extrinsic evidence). But cf. McQuate v. White, 389
S.W.2d 206, 212 (Mo. 1965) ("the solemn provisions and recitals in such an
agreement may not be lightly brushed aside").
48. Generally, in the context of antenuptial agreements contingent upon
death, the party challenging the antenuptial contract has the burden of showing
that the provision for support in the contract is unreasonable, then a presumption
of concealment arises which places the burden of showing full disclosure on the
proponent of the contract. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20-21 (Fla.
1962). Missouri recognizes a similar presumption. Donaldson v. Donaldson, 249
Mo. 228, 248, 155 S.W. 791, 797 (1913). It is unclear whether this presumption
applies to antenuptial contracts contingent upon divorce.
49. 586 S.W.2d at 784.
50. Id.
51. 431 Pa. 144, 244 A.2d 672 (1968).
52. Id. at 150, 244 A.2d at 675-76. The factors in the recovery of main-
tenance under the Missouri dissolution statute are also probably relevant in deter-
mining the reasonableness of the provision for the wife. See RSMO § 452.335
(1978).
53. See Jones v. McGonigle, 327 Mo. 457, 464, 37 S.W.2d 892, 894 (1931);
Donaldson v. Donaldson, 249 Mo. 228, 248, 155 S.W. 791, 797 (1913).
54. Serious ethical problems arise when both parties to the antenuptial
agreement request representation by a single attorney. It is suggested the attorney
should immediately establish which party he is representing and inform the other
party of this fact. He then should suggest that a non-represented party obtain
separate counsel. If separate counsel is not obtained, the attorney should by sepa-
12
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the requirement of independent legal advice is almost absoluteA5 The
absence of separate representation was a key factor in Ferry. Had the wife
received legal advice before she signed the agreement, the legal misappre-
hension which induced her to sign the contract probably would have been
dispelled. Ferry does not make clear whether independent legal advice is,
absolutely essential for a valid antenuptial agreement contingent upon
divorce or whether the lack of independent advice was merely a factor used
in finding the contract invalid. 56
A final problem of which the family law practitioner should be aware is
what kind of writing is necessary for a valid antenuptial contract contin-
gent upon divorce? In Missouri, antenuptial contracts contingent upon
death must be written, 57 as must separation agreements.5 5 Antenuptial
agreements also fall within Missouri's enactment of the Statute of
Frauds. 59 Arguably, the only Missouri statute which covers antenuptial
rate letter or recital in the contract declare that he has not attempted to give the
non-represented party any legal advice. If the spouses are separately represented
by counsel, the attorney drafting the agreement should obtain a certificate from
the other attorney that he has consulted with his client and advised him of the
contract's legal effect. Cathey, supra note 33, at 277-80, 290. See MO. SUP. CT.
R. 4, EC 5-15 to -16. Cf. Mo. BAR ADVISORY COMMITTEE, FORMAL OPINION
109, 30J. Mo. BAR 168 (1974) (advising that it is ethical for an attorney to draft a
joint petition for dissolution of marriage provided the parties are in agreement on
all things and the attorney makes clear that he is representing only one of the peti-
tioners).
55. Ignoring the ethical considerations, "there is no hard and fast rule re-
quiring that ... persons standing in a fiduciary or confidential relation ... have
... independent advice." Annot., 123 A.L.R. 1505, 1505-06 (1939). Another ap-
proach is to presume dominance by the husband and make this presumption
rebuttable only by proof of independent advice. Id. at 1506. A third approach is
to say that there is no full and frank disclosure unless the parties have indepen-
dent advice. Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 302-03, 494 P.2d 208,
214 (1972). Contra, In re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wash. 2d 649, 655, 565 P.2d
790, 793 (1977); In re Marriage of Cohn, 18 Wash. App. 502, 508-10, 569 P.2d
79, 83 (1977).
56. 586 S.W.2d at 787.
57. The Missouri statute provides:
The rights of inheritance or any other statutory rights of a surviving
spouse of a decedent who dies intestate shall be deemed to have been
waived if prior to, or after, the marriage such intended spouse or spouse
by a written contract did agree to waive such rights, after full disclosure
of the nature and extent thereof, including the nature and extent of all
property interests of the parties, and if the thing or promise given to the
waiving party is a fair consideration under all the circumstances.
RSMO § 474.120 (1978). See also id. § 474.220.
58. See statute cited note 27 supra.
59. "No action shall be brought.., to charge any person upon any agree-
ment made in consideration of marriage, . . . unless the agreement ... or some
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contracts contingent upon divorce is the Statute of Frauds.60 An unre-
solved issue is whether a written memorandum signed by the party to be
charged satisfies the writing requirement under the dissolution and pro-
bate laws. 61 This becomes important in considering the transmutation
doctrine. 62 Some cases hold that an oral antenuptial agreement to trans-
mute separate property into marital or community property that is ratified
or executed after the marriage satisfies the Statute of Frauds requirement
and is enforceable. 63
As the first Missouri case on the subject, the Ferry decision ostensibly
makes a significant change in the law by declaring that antenuptial con-
tracts contingent upon divorce are not per se invalid as against public
policy. But by requiring that these contracts pass both the conscionability
standard applied to separation agreements and the standards of review for
antenuptial contracts contingent upon death, the court as a practical mat-
ter may have made a valid contract impossible to draft. Uncertainty as to
whether the contract will be judged for conscionability at the time of ex-
ecution, the time of enforcement, or both, the question of what standard
gauges conscionability, and the problem of what constitutes a reasonable
amount of support for an economically dependent spouse, leave the drafts-
man in a dilemma. On one horn of the dilemma an attorney can offer to
draft an antenuptial contract contingent upon divorce with the hope that
upon divorce it will not be deemed unconscionable. On the other horn of
the dilemma, since there is a good likelihood that any antenuptial agree-
ment contingent upon divorce that a draftsman could write, even if con-
scionable' at the time it was drafted, would be "unconscionable" at the
time the contract is enforced due to intervening changes in circumstances,
it might be best to avoid drafting antenuptial agreements contingent upon
divorce by making sure that the language used can be construed to be
effective only upon the death of one of the marital partners. Of course, this
alternative deprives the parties of any benefits an antenuptial contract
contingent upon divorce would provide. This unhappy state of affairs will
memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the party to be
charged therewith ...." RSMO § 432.010 (1978).
60. See Branca & Steinberg, Antenuptial Agreements Under California
Law: An Examination of the Current Law and In re Marriage of Dawley, 11
U.S.F.L. REV. 317, 319 (1977).
61. RSMo § 432.010 (1978).
62. The transmutation doctrine allows transformation of separate property
into marital or community property by express or implied agreement of spouses
or by gift inter se. Missouri appears to recognize this doctrine. See Daniels v.
Daniels, 557 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
63. Woods v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 46 Cal. 2d 697, 701, 299 P.2d 657,
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